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THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the last month the regular week-
ly meetings of the Allison Society have
been well attended. The members have
shown marked interest in the proceedings
and a determination to keep the work up
to the usual high standard is general.
On March 23, the regular -programme
was profitably varied by Prof. Woodward's
instructive lecture on Lord Mansfield.
The inter-society debate aroused no
little enthusiasm, and it is safe to say that
it has given an impetus to society work
which will long be felt.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The interest aroused by the inter-society
debate has caused an increased attendance
and loyalty to the Dickinson Society.
Such increased loyalty and attendance
during the genial spring evenings bodes
well for the future interests of this society.
Since the issuing of the last FORUM, no
less than three meetings have been de-
voted to work not strictly society work.
By the courtesy of the Allison Society the
members attended a lecture by Prof. F. C.
Woodward on Friday evening, March 23,
on "Lord Mansfield." Friday evening,
April 20, was devoted to a lecture by Sen-
ator Weakley on* "Processes of State Leg-
islation," under the auspices of the Dick-
inson Society, and the inter-society debate
filled Friday evening, April 6.
At the meeting on March 30, the elec-
tion of officers was held. Mr. Shellen-
berger also delivered a declamation en-
titled "Prairie Belle." Just at this point
the society received an invitation to visit
the Allison Society to hear the farewell
address of William A. Wanner, of Read-
ing, who was about to leave the school.
The society accordingly adjourned to visit
the Allison Society.
April 13, coming during the Easter va-
cation, the regular program was dispensed
with. According to the requirements 'of
the constitution, however, the officers
were installed on this evening.
Messrs. McConnell and Talbot became
members of the organization during the
month.





Executive Committee-W. T. Stauffer,
H. L. Henderson, F. H. Rhodes.
Treasurer-H. S. Winlack.
Dist. Atty.-E. T. Daugherty.
Sergeant at Arms-A. Light.
Prothonotary-C. S. Davis.
Warden-l. J. Ryan.
Clerk of Court-W. H. Points.
Constable-W. H. Trude.
Register of Wills-J. N. Minnich.
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WEORCAN CLUB.
Spring has done nothing to diminish
the ardor and zeal of the members of this
organization. On the contrary it seems
that each succeeding meeting is better
than the preceding, both because of the
increased interest and because of the nov-
elty of the features of the programmes.
The greatest benefits derived by the
members of the club from the meetings,
excluding the reading of Shakespeare,
which still continues, are probably par-
liamentary drill and extemporaneous dis-
cussions.
The following features appeared on the
programmes of the last month:
Impromptu discussion of the question,
"Resolved, That examinations should be
abolished in colleges where the daily reci-
tation system is in use," affirmatively
by L. F. Hess and W. H. Taylor, and
negatively by W. T. Stauffer and W. A.
Valentine; an extemporaneous speech by
A. Light on "Duties of an Attorney to
His Client ;" a declamation by L. F. Hess,
and responses to mock toasts on subjects
assigned by the president.
MAJOR PILCHER'S ENTERTAINMENT
TO THE SENIORS.
On Wednesday evening, April 18, Major
Pilcher gave a reception and dinner to his
Senior class in Mledical Jurisprudence at
his residence on W. Pomfret St.
Dean Trickett and Registrar Ames, of
the college, were special guests.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Charles C. Greer, '93, was re-elected city
solicitor of Johnstown without opposition.
Edwin S. Comrey, formerly of the class
of 1901, has been admitted to practice in
the supreme and superior courts of Ten-
lessee.
Joseph Jeffreys, '96, Charles McMeans,
'99, Charles E. Daniels, '98, Garrett B.
Stevens, '99, Win. M. Flannigan, '99, and
D. Edward Long, '99, have visited Carlisle
during the past week.
William A. Jordan, '99, has been ad-
initted to the Allegheny county bar.
LECTURE BY PROF. WOODWARD.
On the evening of March 23rd, Prof. F.
C. Woodward lectured before the Law
School, at the request of the Allison So-
ciety. The subject which he had chosen
for the lecture was "Lord Mansfield."
After giving a short review of the life of
this able jurist, he began to criticise his
life. Lord Mansfield gained his fame
when he appeared for the City of Edin-
burgh in the famous disfranchisement bill
because of the Porteous mob, and his de-
fense of several English nobles on the
charge of treason.
In politics he was a Tory, and opposed
the colonies defending a weak govern-
ment against the assaults of Pitt, each
contestant being at his best, as Mansfield
was stronger in defense and Pitt in attack.
From a standpoint of cold logic, Mans-
field was probably superior to Pitt, but in
vehemence of assault Pitt was Mansfield's
superior. His fame, however, depends
upon his reputation as a jurist, and it is
here where he best served mankind.
In his career as a judge he effected a
number of reforms. Among them he sim-
plified practice and procedure, and rid
both of many technicalities; he created
the law of insurance; he found the Eng-
lish inercantilelaw in a chaotic state, and
left it in a form almost equivalent to a
code; he fixed the rightsof colonies under
the English law; struck a fatal blow at
slavery; was the first to allow Quakers to
affirm; andalways strongly favored reli-
gious toleration in politics.
The principal charges brought against
Lord iansfield are dishonesty and a lack
of moral courage. To substantiate the
latter charge, it has been contended that
he reversed the outlawry of Wilkes when
the case was clearly against the outlawed,
simply because of the strong and threat-
ening public sentiment in his favor, on
the ground of a mere technicality, when
Mansfield's usual course was to disregard
mere technicalities.
Mr. Woodward contended, however,
that Mansfield's unbending devotion to
the cause of freedom of consciemce during
the Gordon riots, in which his house was
burned and he narrowly escaped personal
injury, shows a high degree of moral
courage.
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LECTURE BY SENATOR WEAKLEY.
The Dickinson Society was very fortu-
nate in securing Senator Weakley to lec-
ture before the School on Friday evening,
April 20th, on the subject, "Processes of
State Legislation." A large and enthusi-
astic audience, composed of the members
of both the Allison and Dickinson socie-
ties, greeted the ex-legislator on his ap-
pearance.
Having been introduced by Mr. Ship-
man, the President of the Allison Society,
Mr. Weakley proceeded to describe the
General Assembly, and its machinery for
legislation. He then showed that a bill
presented to the Legislature for passage
must contain only one subject, clearly ex-
pressed in the title; must contain al en-
acting clause; that to secure its passage it
must be read at length on three separate
days in each house; it must be passed by
a majority of all the members of each
house, and the yeas and nays must be
called and recorded on the passage of each
bill.
He supposed a bill, and traced it through
the varying processes until it becomes an
act. The bill is offered to the House by
an Assemblyman standing at his desk, is
carried to the Speaker by the page, and is
by him referred to a committee, which
recommends its passage or rejection. Af-
ter having been printed, and a copy hav-
ing been placed on the desk of each mem-
ber, the bill is placed on the order for first
reading. It then comes up for first read-
ing, is read section by section, and usually
agreed to. When the bill comes up for
second reading the House goes into com-
mittee of the whole, reads the bill section
by section, and amends it or agrees to it.
The determination of the committee of the
whole is reported to the House, when the
bill is again read, section by section. The
bill is usually debated on second reading,
and, being agreed to on second reading,
comes up for third reading, when it is
again read, section by section, and finally
passed or rejected. The vote on third
reading is by yeas and nays.
The bill is then sent to the Senate for
concurrence, where it is treated just as in
the House, except that it is not read in
place. The presiding officer of each house
having signed the bill before the house it-
self, the bill is handed to the Secretary of
the Commonwealth, who marks on it the
date of reception and any objection he
may see to it, and hands it to the Gover-
nor. The Governor signs the bill, when
it becomes a law; or vetoes it, when it is
lost, if not carried by both houses over his
veto.
THE INTER-SOCIETY DEBATE.
The first annual inter-society debate of
the Dickinson and Allison Societies was
held in Library Hall on Friday evening,
April 6. The members of the two socie-
ties were all present and each side cheered
enthusiastically for its standard bearers.
Never before has such enthusiasm been
shown in any event which has taken
place in the Law School.
After several rounds of cheering and ap-
plause, the presiding officer, Prof. Fred-
eric C. Woodward, opened the meeting.
The question for discussion was, "Re-
solved, That those combinations among
manufacturers which are commonly
known as trusts are detrimental to the
public welfare." Two members of the
Dickinson Society, Messrs. H. L. Hender-
son and H. J. Shellenberger, upheld the
affirmative, while Messrs. W. S. Rother-
meel and W. A. Valentine, of the Allison
Society, supported the negative of the
proposition. The societies were honored
in having as their judges on this occasion
Hon. Filmore Maust, John R. Miller,
Esq., and Dr. S. S. Bishop.
Mr. Henderson, who opened the debate,
showed that the results of the formations
of trusts are four, viz: To smother com-
petition, to control prices, to lower wage-,
and to manufacture a poorer article at the
same or a greater price. Taking the great
trusts of the country as examples, he
showed that wages had usually fallen
under the trusts, and where they had
risen the rise was due to general prosper-
ity and not due to the trusts; that gener-
ally the price of the manufactured article
had risen, and where that price had fallen
the fall had not been proportionate to the
fall in the price of raw material; how
competition is smothered by crushing out
smaller concerns and by giving a reduc-
tion to those who buy exclusively from
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the trust; and how, as a result of paying
for the work done by the job, the article
manufactured is of a poorer quality under
the trust.
Mr. Rothermel, the second speaker,
proved that modern enterprises must
needs be conducted on so large a scale that
a large command of capital is necessary
and, as no one man has sufficient means
to carry on such enterprises, several per-
sons must unite their capital in one or-
ganization ; that by uniting a number of
persons in the same business, a trust tends
to distribute profits among a larger num-
ber of people and enlists the intelligence
and skill of many instead of few and
thereby reduces the price of production
and increases the grade of the product;
that by concentrating a business to one
point and uniting small plants into large
ones, trusts effect an economizing in busi-
ness impracticable under the old ways of
manufacturing, and that by extending
the limits of the business trusts serve the
public more generally and tend to reduce
the price of the manufactured article.
The third speaker, Mr. Shellenberger,
argued that the trust, after having driven
middlemen and small producers out of the
business by underselling them, gains a
supreme control over the market price,
and raises it to suit its own private and
selfish ends; that, as it is a principle of
trusts not to allow their profits to decrease,
and as natural causes would sometimes
cause such a decrease, trusts lower wages
at such times, and do not raise them after-
ward; that, as they pay for the work
which is done for them by the job, or re-
quire a certain amount of work to be done
within a certain time, the tendency is to
cause hurried work, and produce a poorer
article; and that, as the tendency of the
trust is to estrange the employer from the
employee, and to make machines of the
latter, the trust destroys the young man's
chance for future intellectual development.
The last speaker, Mr. Valentine, con-
tended that, as trusts gather a number of
persons, and concentrate their minds on a
single object for the common benefit, any
improvements or economies which any-
one of these persona discovers or practices
will be instantly reported, and thus the
entire company will secure the benefit
from such improvements or economies;
that, as trusts concentrate the manufac-
ture of articles at fewer places, and sell a
larger quantity, they are able to give the
public an improved, product at a less price,
and still make a profit for the stockholder;
that, as trusts are able by their large capi-
italization to tide over times of depression,
they will give the laborer a boon in the
shape of permanent employment; and
that, as trusts tend to reduce the hours of
labor, they give the laborer a greater
chance for intellectual improvement.
Each speaker was allotted a short time
in which to sum up. Hon. Fillmore
Maust announced the decision of the
judges to be in the affirmative by a vote of.
two to one. The result of this debate is
to have aroused a great deal of enthusiasm
among the members of the two organiza-
tions, and it is hoped that hereafter these
societies will meet yearly in friendly con-
tests of this kind.
MOOT COURT.





STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On January 1, 1895, Mary Smith was
injured by the defendant, and sustained
injury to the extent of $5,000. She em-
ployed William Jones as attorney, who
brought suit and became the attorney of
record. On May 1, 1895, Jones was dis-
charged as attorney, and William Biddle
employed, though he did not enter an ap-
pearance untl September 1,1895. On July
1, 3,895, Jones agreed with the company to
settle, and entered into an agreement to do
so for $1,000. This was accepted, and the
money paid to Jones, and entered on the
record. Jones absconded with the money.
On November 1, 1895, William Biddle
appears in court and moves to have the
settldment stricken off.
KATz and RoBITAILLE for the plaintifi.
1. An attorney cannot settle or compro-
mise a suit without the client's consent.
Maxfield v. Carr, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 209; Ely v.
Lamb, 34 Pa. 315; Housewick v. Miller,
THE FORUM.
93 Pa. .14; Phila. & Reading R. R. v.
Penny., 4 Pa. 271; Mackus' Heirsv. Adam,
99 Pa. 143.
2. If the purchaser pay the money to a
person not authorized to receive it he is
liable to pay it over again. Lord'Chan-
cellor Chumford, in Jones v. Chaplin.
LIGHT and DOUGHERTY for the defend-
ant.
1. Jones had a right to compromise the
claim. Township of Whitehall v. Keller, 12
W. N. C. 178; Miller V. Preston, 154 Pa.
63; Kissick v. Heiseter, 185 Pa. 184; Scott
v. Seiler, 5 Watts 246.
2. A revocation is effectpal and binding
only as against thosewho have notice that
it, has been made. Morgan v. Steel, 5
Binney, 305; Johnson v. Christian, 3
Wheaton 101; Com. v. Barstable Savings
Bank, 126 Mass. 526; Edwardsv. Schaffer,
22 N. Y. 183; Chaflin v. Lenheim, 66 N.
Y. 23.
3. A principal who neglects to disavow
an"act of his agent makes the act his own.
Miller v. Preston, 154 Pa. 63; Kelsey v.
Nat. Bank, 69 Pa. 427; Bredin v. Dubarry,
14S. &R. 26.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The case at bar presents three important
points: First, has an attorney the power
to compromise his client's case without
the client's consent? Second, has the R.
R. Co. a right to set-off the $1,000 paid
under such compromise against any subse-
quent verdict which may be rend6red?
Third, was William Biddle, the second at-
torney employed to conduct the plaintiff's
cause, negligent in not entering his ap-
pearance more promptly?
As to the first point, we will say that an
attorney cannot compromise his client's
case without the client's consent or sanc-
tion, for if an attorney should be allowed
io compromise without his client's con-
sent, it would lead to many abuses and
difficulties between counsel and client,
whoserelations should be very harmonious
and confidential.
In Stokely vs. Robinson, 34 Pa. 315,
which was an action of ejeetment,
the attorneys compromised and the
court entered judgment, whereupon the
defendant sued out a writ, and assigned
the compromise for error.
Woodward, J., in his opinion said: "An
attorney is allowed to submit his client's
cause to arbitration under the arbitration
Act of 1806, but an attorney is not allowed,
and has no authority to compromise a suit
without the authority or sanction of his
client." This is just what has been done
in this case at bar; the attorney has corn
promised with the R. R. Co. without the
consent of his client, for a very much less
sum than that sued for.
In Houseneck v. Miller, 93 Pa. 514, Mr.
Justice Gordon said that an attorney,
by virtue of his professional relation, has
no power to compromise his client's case,
without the client's authority or sanction.
Houston v. Mitchell, 14 S. & R. 307;
Sackhouse v. O'Hara's Ex'rs., 14 Pa. 88;
Mackey v. Adair, 99 Pa. 143.
Jones was to bring suit to recover $5,0('0,
and not to compromise. As he had no au-
thority to do so, we must come to the con-
clusion that the agreement entered into by
the attorney and the R. R. Co. is void.
The next point to be taken in considera-
tion is whether Biddle was negligent in
not making a more prompt appearance.
We think not, as an attorney has a reason-
able time within which to bring a suit,
and we do not think five months is an un-
reasonable time.
Another point is whether the R. R. Co.
should be allowed to set-off the $1,000
already paid against any subsequent
verdict which may be rendered. We
think not, as that was paid as a full satis-
faction of the claim, and not as a part
paynient, and as the compromise was void,
the payment of the money is void, and
should not be allowed to be set off.
But it is contended that the R. R. Co.
had no notice of the revocation or dis-.
missal. This is true, but at the same time
the attorney was acting outside his em-
plyment, which the R. R. Co. should
have known, and is bound to know, and,
therefore, it cannot be excused on that
ground. The motion to strike off the
settlement is, therefore, granted.
J. N. LIGHTNER, J.
William Jones was employed by Mary
Smith to bring action against the Cum-
berland Valley R. R. Co. for $5,000 dam-
ages which she sustained on January ],
1895. He brought suit and became the at-
torney of record, and was discharged on
May 1, 1895, yet Jones compromised the
claim for $1,000 on July 1st, and had satis-
faction entered on the record, and then ab-
sconded with the money. On May Ist
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Mary Smith employed Win. Biddle to
prosecute suit, who entered his appear-
ance on September 1st, and on November
1, 1895, files this motion, asking that set-
tlement be stricken off. It has been ably
contended by the counsel for the defend-
ant that Mary Smith was negligent in not
informing the defendant of her having
discharged Win. Jones, and that because
of this, and her not being prompt in disa-
vowing the action, that the settlement
should not be stricken off. While it is
true that a principal must promptly disa-
vow the acts of his agent, when they
transcend the authority given him, on
pain of making the agent's acts his own,
it is so only because this silence is an im-
plied ratification of the agent's acts, thus
estopping him from afterward denying the
agent's authority. But a ratification can
only take place where an act is voidable
in its nature, while our Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that a compromise is
absolutely void. Township of Whitehall
v. Keller, 12 W. N. 177. To a like effect
are the cases of Huston v. Mitchell, 14 S.
&. R. 307, and Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Pa.
315, both holding that attorneys cannot
compromise without the express consent
of their regpective clients. In the case of
Holker v. Parker, cited by defendant, the
court held that while compromises were
looked upon with disfavor, yet they would
not be disturbed if they were reasonable
and fair. We think, however, that this
compromise is obviously not reasonable
and fair; and further, since he was not
Mary Smith's attorney at time of making
it, it cannot stand on this ground.
The power to compromise is contrary to
our sense of justice. If the client sees fit
to take the chances of litigation, it should
not be for the attorney to say him nay.
When a claim is put in the hands of an
attorney for prosecution, it is generally
supposed that he will continue it to a de-
cision, which will be reached through the
ordinary channels of adjudication; and to
this end general authority is given him.
But it would be derogatory to the best in-
terests of the legal profession, and apt to
bring it into ill repute, by the inadvertent
use of such a power, which permits a
client's right of action to be destroyed or his
claim diminished by the faulty judgment
or caprice of his attorney. It was said in
99 Pa. 318 that a compromise of a client's
6laim by two attorneys was absolutely
void.
The question presents itself, even though
it cannot be ratified-being void-will the
plaintiff be estopped because of not noti-
fying the defendant- of her discharge of
Jones? The plaintiff has met this argu-
ment by the statement that since he was
a special agent, it put the defendant upon
his guard, and made him look to the
authority of the agent; and further, that
since he could not make this compromise,
it being void, as against public policy,
without express consent of client, that the
defendant company was bound to see that
the agent had the express consent.
We are of the opinion that Jones was
not such a special agent, as the judges re-
ferred to in the several cases which held
that the party dealing with him inust be-
ware, for they dealt with him at their
peril. But we look with more favor on
his second contention, and think that the
defendant company was bound to inquire
concerning the express consent given by
the principal.
Had this been done, or had the defend-
ant company exercised even ordinary dili-
gence, the true fact of Jones' discharge
must have become plain. It is true there
is a presumption that where an attorney
of record appears and performs some act
within the apparent scope of his authority,
that he has implied authority, such as will
protect those dealing with him. But our
cases hold that a compromise is not within
the "apparent scope" of the agent's au-
thority.
There is nothing to show when Mary
Smith had notice; but the fact that her
attorney, Win. Biddle, entered an appear-
ance on September Ist, is sufficient to war-
rant an inference that he then became
cognizant of the satisfaction entered by
Jones. The knowledge of the agent so
affects the principal that she will be
deemed to have received notice at that
time. There is no evidence to show
whether she gave notice to defendant
company or not of her refusal to be bound,
but we think that her delay of two months
in bringing suit is not such an unreasona-
ble delay as will preclude her, unless the
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rights of third parties haye intervened,
which does not appear.
For these reasons we think the rule
should be granted, and the satisfaction
stricken from the record. So ordered.
L. FLOYD HESS, J.
IN THE SUPREME COURT.
The compromise between William
Jones, attorney for Mary Smith, and the
defendant, resulted in the payment of
$1,000 by the defendant, and the entry of
a settlement of the suit upon the record.
This settlement the court has struck off,
and the result of a trial has been to find a
verdict for the plaintiff for $4,000. The
error assigned here is, that the settlement
should have been regarded by the court as
conclusive. The learned court declined
thus to regard it. Were they in error?
Two reasons for disregarding it were al-
leged in the court below. It was alleged
(1) that the authority of the attorney who
made it, had at the time of making it
been withdrawn, and (2) that had it not
been withdrawn it neverwas wideenough
to embrace the making of such a settle-
ment. The last of these reasons we shall
consider first.
1. The principle is very well established
that the mere relation of attorney and
client does not confer on the former the
power to surrender any portion of what is
claimed by the latter, by way of compro-
mise. Isaacs v. Zugsmith, 103 Pa. 77;
Brockley v. Brockley, 122 Pa. 1; Mackey
v. Adair, 99 Pa. 143. Says Trunkey, J.,
"Persons dealing with an attorney-at-law
respecting his client's business may justly
infer that he has all the power implied by
the relation, but notthathe has thepowers
of a general agent to compromise and re-
lease debts or transfer and convey the
goods or lands of his client." 103 Pa. 77.
The doctrine is correctly stated in P. & L.
Dig. of Decisions thus, "An attorney-
at-law has no power to compromise the
claim of his client without special author-
ity from the client for that purpose, and a
compromise effected without such author-
ity is void." 2 P. &. L. Dig. 1,783. Cf.
Houseneck v. Miller, 93 Pa. 514; North
Whitehall Township v. Keller, 100Pa. 105;
Phila. & R. R. R. v. Christman, 4 Penny
271.
The plaintiff, so far as it appears, was in
the neighborhood and could easily have
been consulted. There was no cause for
haste. Jones was employed to bring the
suit. It was no part of his employment to
agree on a sum, payment of which should
discharge the Railroad Company. The
learned judges of the Common Pleas
rightly concluded that the compromise was
void, and could be repudiated by Mary
Smith, even had Jones' authority not been
revoked.
2 Had it been one of the ordinary
powers of an attorney-at-law to compro-
mise the suit, we think the defendant
would have been justified in effecting the
compromise with Jones. He had been
employed as aftorney, and as such, had
appeared in the suit of record. How
many steps in the action had been taken
when, on May 1st, he was disdharged by
the plaintiff does not appear. The dis-
charge was not noted on the record, and
the succeeding attorney, Wm. Biddle, did
not mark his name to the record until
Sept. 1st; four months after Jones' dis-
charge. The compromise was made mid-
way between these two dates. The de-
fendant would then reasonably assume, as
he in fact did assume, the continuance of
Jones' authority, and, had the power to
compromise been one of the powers of an
attorney, could reasonably suppose the
compromise he was making was binding
on the plaintiff and himself. It fails to
be thus binding, not because of the revo-
cation of Jones' authority, but because his
original appointment did not confer on
him the power to make it.
A subordinate question is, concerning
the right of the defendant to set-off the
$1,000 already paid by it to Jones, against
the damages found bythejury. This right
has been denied by the learned court be-
low. The reason assigned by Judge
Lightner is, we think, satisfactory. Jones
was, when the payment was made, agent
to prosecute the action to verdict and judg-
ment, but not to receive any money in an-
ticipating payment, in part or in whole,
of such judgment as might be recovered.
Still less was he agent to receive a sum of
money as a consideration for discontinuing
or settling the suit. Had it been within
the actual or even the apparent scope of
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Jones' power to receive thp $1,000 for the
client, the payment of that sum would be
a good payment, despite his secret super-
sedure. But it never was in his power to
receive such a payment. The payment
cannot, therefore, affect Mary Smith.
The defendant must look to Jones for the
money.
It is suggested by the learned counsel
for the appellant, that the long delay in
moving the court to strike off the settle-
ment, should preclude a repudiation of it.
The settlement was made on July 1st, 1895.
Win. Biddle, Esq., appeared to the record
Sept. 1st, and on Nov. 1st, four months
after it was made, moved the court to
strike off the settlement. It does not ap-
pear that during these four monthp, the
defendant has taken any steps which it
would not have taken, had it not relied on
the finalty of the settlement. We cannot
see that the lapse of so short a time should
of itself estop or prevent the plaintiff from
proceeding with the action to verdict and
judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
HENRY APPLETON vs. JOHN
JONES.
Ante-nuptial contract impairing status of
parties under marriage compact-De-
sertion-Husband's liability for wife's
expenses after desertion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Prior to the contract of John Jones with
Susanna Appleton to marry her, a minor,
he agrees with her and her parents that
he and she, if married, shall reside with
the latter, and the survivor of them, so long
as he or she, the survivor, shall live, and
that he will not take up any other abode,
and insist on his wife forsaking her pa-
rents, and living there with him, during
either parent's life. She relying on this
agreement, the contract to marry was
made, and in due time the marriage was
accomplished. John Jones and Susanna,
his wife, continued to live with her pa-
rents for about one year, during Which a
son was born to them.
John Jones not having lived harmo-
niously with the parents of the wife, then
withdraws from their residence and takes
up another, to which he invites his wife
to come with the child. She declines to
follow him, insisting on her right under
the agreement to abide with her parents,
and retains the child. During the resi-
dence with the wife's parents John Jones
had, while she was in infirm health,
neglected to provide a servant, though
financially able to do so, and insisted that
his wife should attend to the cooking and
other household duties in person. He was
also at times irascible, addressing her
with harshness and asperity. He also at
times behaved towards her parents with
indignity and insult, but did notput hands
on them or use violence of any sort, nor
threaten violence.
The wife refusing to follow him, John
Jones not being asked to supply her, in
fact supplies her neither with money nor
goods for the support of herself or child,
but they are fed, clothed and furnished
with medical attendance and board by her
parents for the space of two years after his
withdrawal from their house, with no
other request from him than sueh as the
law would imply, if any, from the cir-
cumstances stated.
During this time they expend $40 for
clothing (a reasonable amount), and $20
for the child's clothing (a reasonable
amount), $5 for medical attendance to
wife, 3 medical attendance to child, and
$3 per week for food of wife and $1.50 per
week for the support of the child (these
amounts being reasonable). A fair com-
pensation for lodging the wife would be
$150 and an equal sum for the child. As-
sumpsit by the father for the money so
expended for his daughter and grandson,
and for compensation for their lodging
against John Jones.
SHAFFER and WARNER for the plain-
tiff.
1. A husband living separate from his
wife is bound to provide her and his chil-
dren with necessaries. Kimball v. Keyes,
11 Wend. 34; Snover v. Blair, 25 N. J. L.
94; Fitler v. Fitler, 33 Pa. 50.
2. The articles furnished were necessa-
ries. Lamson v. Varnum. 171 Mass. 237;
Mohney v. Evans, 51 Pa. 80.
LAVENS and LEE for the defendant.
1. It is against the policy of the law
that the stalims of the parties under a mar-
riage contract should be impaired by ante-
nuptial contract. Powell v. Powell, 29
Vt. 148; Barnett v. Kininmel, 35 Pa. 13 ;
Franklin v. Franklin, 154 Mass. 515; Am.
& Eng. Zncyc., Vol. 14, p. 539.
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2. The acts of wife in refusing to follow
husband constitute desertion, and she is
liable for her own expenses, as well as
those of the child she retained.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
I. Although it has been conceded that
a husband cannot compel his wife to re-
side in a place where her health would be
in danger (for that would be cruelty), or
to follow him to a foreign land-Bishop v.
Bishop, 30 Pa. 412, or to live with his rela-
tives-Powell v. Powell, 29 Vt. 148, the
general rule is well settled that the hus-
band has the right to aecide where the
family residence shall be, and to change it
as often as pleasure, business or health
dictates, and that the wife must follow
him or be chargeable with desertion. Cut-
ler v. Cutler, 2 Brewst. 511; Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Pa. 380; Boyce v. Boyce, 23 N.
J. Eq. 337., This rule has its foundation
in sound public policy, and we are of the
opinion that an ante-huptial agreement
by which the husband surrenders his right
to fix and to change the domicile, should
not be enforced. The precise question
does not appear to have arisen in this
State, but in the South Carolina ease of
Hair v. Hair, 10 Pick. Eq. 163, the court
says: "Such a promise is a nullity. The
contract of matrimony has its well under-
stood and its well defined legal duties, and
it is not competent for the parties to in-
terpolate into the marriage compact any
condition in abridgment of the husband's
lawful authority over her person or his
claim to her obedience."
II. Without regard to the ante-nuptial
agreement, was the wife justified by her
husband's treatment of her in refusing to
follow him to his new abode? It has
been determined that the "reasonable
cause" which justifies a wife's desertion
and abandonment of her husband must
be such as would entitle her to a divorce.
Eshbach v. Eshbach, 23 Pa. 343. By the
provisions of our statute a wife is entitled
to a divorce when her husband "shall
have by cruel and barbarous treatment
endangered the wife's life, or offered such
indignities to her person as to render her
condition intolerable and life burdensome,
and thereby forces her to withdraw from
his house and family." Act of 1815, March
13, P. & L. Dig., Vol. 1, c. 1633. And in
the interprepation of this clause of the
statute, it has been declared that there
must be actual personal violence or the
reasonable apprehension of it, or such a
course of treatment as endangers her life
or health, and renders cohabitation un-
safe-Detrick's Appeal, 117 Pa. 452; May
v. May, 62 Pa. 206; Gordon v. Gordon, 48
Pa. 226; and moreover, that a single act of
cruelty is not sufficient. Richards v.
Richards, 37 Pa. 225.
In the case at bar it appears that the
husband was sometimes harsh to his wife,
and that he likewise behaved in an in-
sultiug manner toward her parents, and
that though the wife was in infirm health,
he neglected and refused to employ a ser-
vant. Clearly, these facts alone do not
show cruel and barbarous treatment as de-
fined in the statute and cases cited. He
never so far as threatened violence to his
wife's person, and the most serious of the
charges against him is that of neglecting
to employ a servant, though able to do
so. There is no evidence, however, as to
thenature of the wife's infirmity of health,
or the extent of the household duties she
was compelled to perform, and we are
therefore unable to say, as a matter of law-
that compelling her to do her own house-
work endangered her health to such a de-
gree as to render cohabitation under the
circumstances unsafe. That such at least
was not the cause of her refusal to cohabit
is indicated by her apparent willingness
to live with him in her parents' house.
For the reasons stated, the wife's refusal
to follow her husband must he regarded as
a desertion, and it follows that the hus-
band is not liable for necessaries subse-
quently furnished her by her parents.
Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & R. 247, 250;
Walter v. Simpson, 7 W. &. S. 83; Breinig
v. Meitzler, 23 Pa. 156. The same is true
of necessaries for the infant child retained




vs. BOROUGH OF CARLISLE.
Attachment-M1unicipal corporations-
Garnishee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On February 1st, 1898, Samuel Smiley
received the contract for the building of a
sewer system from the borough of Carlisle.
The sum to be paid was $10,000. The
work was finished on December 1st, 1899,
and accepted by the borough. But $8,000
has been paid to Smiley, and $2,000 is still
due. Smiley purchased certain pipe from
the plaintiff for $1,000. This bill he re-
fuses to pay, though judgment has been
obtained against him. The Arthur Manu-
facturing Company has attached the
money in the hands of the borough due
Smiley.
BASEHORE and HEIST for the plaintiff.
1. Money owing under every descrip-
tion of contractual obligation is subject to
attachment. In re. Glen Iron Works, 13
W. N. (3. 388; 1 P. & L. Dig. 403.
2. A borough may be garnishee. Heeb-
er v. Chave, 5 Pa. 115.
SEBRING and ALEXANDER for the de-
fendant.
1. A municipal corporation cannot be
made a garnishee. Grier v. Rawley, 1
Pitts. 1; Phila. Granite and Blue Stone
Co. v. Douglass, 14 0. C. 244; Pettebone v.
Bardslee, 1 Kulp 180, (a county); Van
Volkenburgh v. Earley, I Kulp 216, (a
borough); Morrell v. Bank of Penna., 2
Phila. 61,(a state officer); Fairbanks Co. v.
Kirk, 22 C. C, 57 (1899).
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The plaintiff has obtained a judgment
against Samuel Smiley for $1,000, and has
issued an attachment execution thereon
against the borough of Carlisle, which
owes Smiley $2,000. The borough'of Car-
lisle has filed a motion to quash the at-
tachment, on the ground thatbeing a mu-
nicipal corporation it cannot be gar-
nisheed.
Such a corporation cannot be made a
garnishee in execution attachment. 1
Trickett, Liens 433.
For this reason, we think, the attach-
nient should be quashed. 1 Br. Practice
696.
Attachment quashed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. BURT &
PACKARD.
Constitutionality of semi-monthly pay law,
Act of May 20, 1891, P. L. 96.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendants are the owners of a shoe
factory located in the borough of Ship-
pensburg. It has been their custom to
pay all employes on the last Saturday of
each calendar month. The district-at-
torney brings this indictment for a viola-
tion of the "Semi-monthly Pay Law," of
May 20, 1891, P. L. 96.
The defendants allege the Act to be a
violation .of Art. 1, See. 17, and Art. 3, Sec.
7, of the State Constitution.
Motion to quash bill.
STAUFFER and LIGHTNER for the Corn-
monwealth.
1. Art. 1, Sec. 17, of the Constitution,
does not apply for this Act does not im-
pair the obligation of contract.
2. Art. 3, See. 7, of the Constitution,
does not apply, for there is no class legis-
lation in the Act under consideration.
Besides, this article is to be liberally con-
strued. Seabold v. Commissioners. 187
Pa. 318; Lloyd v. Smith, 176 Pa.* 213;
Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246.
MITCHELL and BOWERS for the defend-
ant.
1. The Act is a violation of Art. 1, Sec.
17, and Art. 3, See. 7, of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania, and the bill of indict-
mentshould be quashed. Of. Godcharles
v. Wigeman, 112 Pa. 431; Showalter v.
Ehlan, 5 Sup. 242.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
On the motion to quash the indictment
against Burt & Packard, the only cause
asigned for quashing it is the unconsti.
tutionality of the Act of May 20th, 1891,
2 P. & L. 4,801, which, it is alleged, that
the defendants have violated. The first
section of that Act enacts that "every in-
dividual firm, association or corporation
3mploying wage-workers, skilled or ordi-
nary, laborers engaged at manual or cleri-
cal work in the business of mining or
manufacturing, or any other employes,
shall make payment in lawful money of
the United States to the said employes,
laborers and wage-workers, or to their au-
thorized representatives, the firstpayment
to be made between the first and the fif-
teenth, and the second between the fif-
teenth and thirtieth of each month, the
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full net amount of wages or earnings due
said employes, laborers and wage-workers
upon the first and fifteenth instant of each
and every month wherein such payments
are made." Refusal to make payments
when demanded upon the dates thus set
forth is declared to be a misdemeanor, on
conviction of which a fine not exceeding
$200 may be imposed.
The defendants are indicted for refusing
to pay wages of certain employes, on their
demand, on the days mentioned in the
Act.
The Act is alleged to conflict with Art.
I, Sec. 17, and with Art. 3, Sec. 7, of the
Constitution of this State. The seven-
teenth section of Art. 1 declares that no
"law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts" shall be passed. But a law for-
bidding a contract does not impair the ob-
ligation of a contract made in violation of
it. No law can be censurable, under this
clause of the Constitution, unless there is,
before its adoption, a contract which gives
rise to an obligation, and unless it impairs
this pre-3xlsting obligation. It does not
appear that any contract between the de-
fendants and the employes, whose wages
they have refused to pay, existed before
the passage of the Act of 1891.
The first section of Art. 1 of the Consti-
tution dedlares that "all men are born
equally free and independent, and have
certain indefeasible rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property and reputation, and
of pursuing their own happiness." Itmay
be that by this section, a right to make
contracts, within limits, is secured as a
portion of "liberty" and as a means of
"acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property," or of "pursuing * * happi-
ness." If this is so, there are two answers
to the suggestion that the first section of
the Act of 1691, so far as invoked by this
indictment, violates this right.
1. No contract is alleged to have been
made between the defendants and their
employes, by which the pay ment of wages
was deferred beyond two weeks. The de-
fendants are indicted-for having refused to
pay every two weeks. Whether they have
the excuse that by their contract, they
were not required thus to pay, we do not
know. To inquire whether they have,
upon their motion to quash, would be im-
proper. Now, the same section of an Act
might be unconstitutional, so far as its
operation would interfere with the making
and enforcing of contracts, and constitu-
tional, in other respects. We are unable
to see that the Legislature cannot require
employers to pay wages every two weeks,
in the absence of contracts, although the
terms employed by them are wide enough
to cover cases in which there are such
contracts as well as those in which there
are none. Bolton v. Johns, 5 Pa. 145; Bunn
v. Gorgas, 41 Pa. 441.
2. But, even had it appeared that the
defendants had made a contract with their
employes, for less frequent than bi-weekly
payments, and that, consequently, to
punish them for n )t making bi-weekly
payments, would be to impugn their power
effectually to make such contracts, we are
not able to say that the Act would be un-
constitutional. The power of the Legis-
lature to prohibit or restrict the makipg
of contracts has been largely exercised
and conceded by the courts. Two adult
men contract, one to borrow, the other to
lend $1,000 at eight per cent. interest. The
Legislature has said that as respects the
two per cent. in excess of six, the contract
shall be void. What court has denounced
the law as unconstitutional? or said that
such alaw "isan insulting attempt to put
the borrower under a legislative tutelage,
which is not only degrading to his man-
hood, but subversive of his rights as a citi-
zenof the United States." See Godcharles
v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431.
The Act of May 21st, 1855, 2 P. & L.
3,264, makes it criminal to sell oleomarga-
rine. Why? To prevent persons buying
and consuming it. But the courts have
not found in such law any obnoxious legis-
lative tutelage over consumer or buyer.
Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 265. It
might be supposed that a man suijuris
would prefer to decide for himself whether
he should buy and eat oleomargarine.
But the Legislature has kindly supplied
him with a wisdom he lacks, and made
purchase of the obnoxious fat impossible,
and consumption of it difficult, and its
assumption of guardianship has not been
condemned.
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Men suijuris contract occasionally with
employers to exempt the latter from liabil-
ity for the negligence of their servants,
but such contracts have been pronounced
invalid by the courts. Burnett v. Pa. R.
R., 176 Pa. 45. It is difficult to see how a
court can put adult men under tutelage,
and the Legislature not.
Indeed, it is the businessof theState to ex-
ercise a tutelage over its citizens, to preserve
them from fraud, violence and oppression,
and the oppression that may be wrought
through contracts it is as much its duty
to prevent, as any other oppression. He
surely is blind to the most manifest facts
of society, who does not see that in many
contracts the parties are not equally free,
and that for the State to abandon the
weaker to the rapacity of the stronger, is
to abdicate its most solemn and imperious
duty. Consider the regulation of the sale
of bread by weights, 3 W. N. 273; of notes
given for patent rights, Hunter v. Hen-
ninger,93 Pa.373; Shiresv.Commonwealth,
120 Pa. 368; of the hours per day a conduc-
tor on a passenger car may be required to
work; Act March 24, 1887, 1 P. & L, 1,316;
of the making of contracts concerning
land, etc.
The distinction between those suijuris
and those non suijuris, is itself a legisla-
tive one. Married women have been re-
cently transposed from one class to the
other. And it is idle to assume that all
persons of the class roughly denominated
suijurisareso provident, intelligent and in-
dependent, thht they can adequately safe-
guard their interests when dealing with
any other members of that class.
It is well known that the wage earners,
as a class, have little property, and depend
for their daily subsistence on the wages
that they earn. Important moral and
economic reasons require the punctual pay-
ment, at short intervals, of these wages,
and these reasons are so strong ns to over-
ride any consideration of. the desirability
of allowing absolute freedom of the weak
to contract under coercion with the strong.
As to the seventh section of Art. 3,
which the Act of 1891 is supposed to in-
fringe, it will not be possible for us
to say much. Vide, Leonard v. Pierce, 1
Forum 79. Though the Act of 1891 regu-
lates "labor, trade, mining or manufactur-
ing," we do not think it "special" in the
prohibited sense. This Act applies to all
employes without distinction. It applies
to wage-workers, skilled or ordinary, la-
borers at manual or clerical work, in the
business of mining or manufacturing, or
any otheremployes. We are of opinion that
the Constitution does not prohibit sepa-
rate classification of manufacturing and
mining business, and the making of regu-
lations that their special peculiarities seem
to require. The needs with respect to pay-
ment of wages, etc., of the dependent
workers in mills, foundries, factories, may
be different from those of workers in other
lines, and it would be regrettable if the
Constitution should be so construed as to
prevent legislation contrived to meet these
needs.
The motion to quash is dismissed, and
the defendant is ordered to plead.
MARINE INS. CO. vs. WM. CODY.
Lunatic-Negligence - Damages-Subro-
gation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
James Throop owned a vessel, which
Cody chartered for a voyage from Boston
to Philadelphia. A violent storm arose,
and for two days and nights Cody, captain
of the vessel, remained on deck, not sleep-
ing, and eating but little. Meantime he
felt himself becoming exhausted, and re-
sorted to large doses of quinine. His mind
was affected, and his orders to the crew
resulted in the vessel running ashore and
being totally wrecked. Throop bued the
insurance company, and recovered $12,000.
Thereupon the company sued Cody, as
the cause, by his unskillful and negligent
commands, of the accident and loss. De-
fendant asked the court to say to the jury:
(1) No cause of action against him arose to
the plaintiff. (2) If the unskillful orders
were the resultof theexhaustion and tem-
porary mental aberration caused by ex-
cessive watching, labors and the quinine,
the taking of which was made necessary,
he was not responsible. The court told
the jury that insanity was no excuse for
negligence or the want of skill required by
the occasion; and that the insurance con-
pany could recover, if they found the facts
according to the testimony of the plaintiff.
SLOAN and GRAUL for the plaintiff.
1. Insane persons are liable for their
torts, except those in which malice is a
necessar y ingredient. Williams v. Hays,
143 N. Y. 442.
2. The insurance company, having paid
the charterer, is subrogated to his right of
action against Cody. Monticello v. Mol-
lison, 17 How. 153; Mobile, etc., R. R. Co.
v. Jurey, 111 U. S. 594.
RALSTON and BURCHENAL for the de-
fendant.
1. Cody cannot be held liable, for there
is no negligence if a man uses ordinary
care.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an action brought by the Marine
Ins. Co. against Win. Cody to recover
damages for the wrecking of a ship, due
to his alleged negligence.
Cody chartered a vessel, and took her
out of Boston, as captain, intending to run
her to Philadelphia. A violent storm
arose, and for two days and nights Cody
was constantly on duty. In the mean-
time he had taken large doses of quinine.
His mind was affected, and his orders to
the crew resulted in running the vessel
ashore and completely wrecking her.
The question for us to decide is whether
the insanity of the defendant furnishes a
defense to the plaintiff's claim, and it is
the opinion of the court that it does not.
The general rule is that an insane person
s just as responsible for his torts as a sane
person, with the exception of those torts
of which malice is an ingredient. The
law looks to a person who has been dam-
aged, and endeavors to make him whole;
and the liability of a lunatic for his torts
has been placed on several grounds. First,
that when one of two innocent persons
bears a loss, he must bear it whose acts
caused it. Again, it is said that public
policy requires the enforcement of the lia-
bility; that the relatives of the lunatic
may be under inducement to restrain him,
and that tort-feasors may not simulate or
pretend insanity to defend their wrongful
acts causing damage to others. In Bush-
well on Insanity (355) it is said, "Since in
a civil action for tort it is not necessary to
aver or prove any wrongful intent on the
part of the defendant, it is a rule of com-
mon law that although a lunatic may tot
be punished criminally, he is liable in a
civil action for any tort he may commit:"
In Cooley on Torts (9S) the learned
author says: "A wrong is an invasion of a
right to the damage of the party who
suffers it. It consists in the injury done,
and not commonly in the purpose or men-
tal condition of the person or agent do-
ing it."
The law, in giving redress, has in view
the case of the party injured, and the ex-
tent of his injury, and makes what he
suffers the measure of compensation.
In 143 N. Y. 442, which seems to -be an
analogous case, it is held that an insane
person is liable for his torts the same as a
sane person, except for those torts in which
malice, and therefore intention, is a neces-
sary ingredient.
The conclusion of the court, therefore,
is that judgment be for the plaintiff.
WALT. TAYLOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The plaintiff has paid $12,000 to Throop,
the owner of the vessel. Alleging that
the vessel was lost by the unskillful and
careless action of Cody, its captain, the
company brings this action to recover from
Cody the $12,000.
That the company has a right to subro-
gation to the position of Throop as against
Cody, is incontestable. Williams v. Hays,
143 N. Y. 442; 2 May, Insurance, 1030.
But, had Throop any right to recover
from Cody compensation for the loss of
the vessel on the facts disclosed in this
case? The defendant requested the trial
court to tell the jury that there was shown
no right to recover; and, more .pecifically,
that if the unskillful orders of Cody were
the result of the exhaustion and temporary
mental dberration caused by excessive
watching, labor and quinine, the taking
of which was made necessary, Cody was
not responsible, In declining these in-
structions, was the court in error?
Assuming that the commands of Cody,
obedience to which resulted in the wreck
of the vessel, were not such as a comipe-
tently skillful man would have given un-
der the circumstances, we are to ascertain
the causes of the incompetence that
prompted them. It is not shown that
Cody had been deficient in a sailor's skill
and knowledge. An unusual storm had
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arisen. He was obliged to remain on
deck, without sleep, for two days and
nights, eating but little. There was noth-
ing improper in this. He not only had a
right, but apparently was under a duty
thus to exert himself for the safety of the
ship. Exhaustion supervening, Cody re-
.-orted to large doses of quinine. He was
not culpably responsible for the ex-
haustion. There is no evidence that he
was careless or reckless in the use of the
quinine. He took that drug. So had mil-
lions before him. He took it in large
doses. But in how large? In five-grain,
ten-gi'ain, fifteen-grain doses? How often
did he repeat them? Would a prudent
man, under the circumstances, have re-
frained from taking'them? The evidence
is insufficient to justify an affirmative re-
sponse.
The situation, then, is this: A violent
storm requires and justifies such exertions
of Cody as prostrated him. Exhausted,
he not imprudently takes quinine. The
u nforeseen and unforeseeable effect of the
exhaustion and the quinine is the loss of
sane judgment and skill Of this loss the
shipwreck is the consequence. For which
of the series of causes is Cody responsible ?
Not for the storm, surely. Nor for the
watching which it made obligatory on
him. Nor for the exhaustion that, with-
out his prevision of it, followed. Nor for
the taking of the quinine, which, so far as
appears, prudence and regard for his re-
sponsibilities dictated. But the loss of
consciousness of the situation of the ship,
and of apprehension of the maneuvers
needful to rescue it from peril, was the
unexpected and, so far as appears, the un-
expectable result. We are unable to say
that Cody is responsible pecuniarily for
the effects of this want of consciousness
and of apprehension. Williams v. Hays,
157 N. Y. 541.
What the liability of an insane man is
generally for his torts is perhaps not quite
clear. He is assumed to be liable for torts,
by Gibson, C. J., in Beale v. See, 10 Pa.
56; and, inter alia, for negligence-Wil-
liams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442. But see 16
Am.. & Eng. Encyc. 410, which combats
the doctrine of the possibility of a lunatic,
or insane person being negligent. Several
Pennsylvania cases hold that a person may
be so immature from youth as to be inca-
pable of care, and that there can be no
negligence on the part of those incapable
of care. If this i so, the idiot, lunatic or
maniac being also incapable of care, would
be incapable of negligence. It is, indeed,
difficult to see how Cody could be accused
of negligence, in any just sense of that
word, when in the condition in which he
is described by the evidence to have been.
Feeling the difficulty of imputing negli-
gence to a child, or a lunatic or insane
man, some judges have attempted to find
another ground of their liability for a mis-
chief to the person or property of another,
emanating from them. Says Gibson, C.
J.: The insane man "is liable to bear the
consequences of his infirmity as he is lia-
ble to bear his misfortunes, on ' the princi-
ple that wherealoss must be borne by one
of two innocent persons, it shall be borne
by him who occasioned it." But what is
it to "occasion" a hurt or injury? A
child of four years runs into an old man,
and throws him down. Has he "occa-
sioned" the hurt? One in sudden peril
wards off a blow from a missile, and causes
it to strike another. Has he "occasioned"
the blow? A throws the body of B against
that of C. Is B the occasion of C's fall?
Surely the fact that some act or motion of
A's body is in the chain of causation of a
hurt to B, does not ipso facto make A re-
sponsible. Beside the causal relation, we
search for some other element. Was there
intention? Was there malice? Was
there negligence? But it is unnecessary
to decide whether Cody could be actiona-
ble had his unskillful acts emanated from
an insanity that existed independently of
his efforts to perform his duty as captain.
The evidence before the jury justified it in
inferring that his insanity was the result
of his strenuous endeavor to save the ves-
sel. The court should, we think, have
affirmed the defendant's second point.
Judgment reversed.
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SAMUEL MAPES vs. HENRY WILE.
Equitable ejectment- Warranty-Set off-
Measure of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Mapes, owning a flour mill, contracted
iii writing to sell it to Wile for $10,000,
orally guaranteeing its capacity to produce
40 bbls. of flour per day. Wile paid $3,000
and possession was given to him, but no
deed was delivered. After he had oper-
ated the mill a short time he discovered it
would not produce more than 10 bbls. of
flour per day. He undertook therefore to
change its machinery and power so that it
would produce 40 bbls. per day, and in
doing so spent $8,000, and consequently
refused to pay any more purchase money
to Mapes or to yield up the possession.
Mapes then brought ejectment. Mapes
agreed to reduce the purchase price from
S7,0J0 to $3,500, on claim that had the
mill been only of capacity to produce 10
bbls. per day it would have been worth
$7,000 at least.
SHIPMAN and LIGHTNER for the plain-
tiff
1. Ejeetment by vendor lies against
vendee when part of the purchase money
has been paid and vendee has defaulted in
payment of'remainder. Walker v. France,
112 Pa. 203; Brown v. Dewitt, 131 Pa. 455;
Daubert v. Pa. R. R., 155 Pa. 178; Moyer
v. Garrett, 96 Pa. 376.
2. For breach of a warranty the pur-
chaser's measure of damages is the differ-
ence between the actual value of the sub-
ject of sale and the value it would have
had at the time of the sale, if it had cor-
responded with the warranty. Beaupland
v. McKeer. 28 Pa. 124; Walker v. France,
112 Pa. 203; City Iron Works v. Barber,
102 Pa. 156; Himes v. Kiehl, 154 Pa. 190.
HEss and LENTZ for the defendant.
1. This is an equitable ejectment for a
balance of purchase money and the de-
fendant has the right (a) To set offany
ulamageshe may have suffered from breachjf plaintiff's warranties. Walker v.
France, 112 Pa. 203. (b) To have the
court decree that'a deed be made upon
payment of balance less such damages as
may be awarded. Mitchell v. De Roche,
I Yeates 12; Brown v. Dewitt, 13 Pa. 453.
2. The measure of damages is the differ-
ence between the value of the property at
the time of the sale capable of producing
10 bbls. per day and the value it would
have had if capable of producing 40 bbls.
Walker v. France, 112 Pa, 203; Wilkinson
v. Ferris, 24 Pa. 190.
CHARGE OF COURT.
Gentlemen of the Jury.-
The case for your consideration is in
substance as follows: Samuel Mapes, to
be hereafter known as the plaintiff, en-
tered into a written contract with Henry
Wile, to be hereafter known as the de-
fendant, whereby the plaintiff agreed to
convey to the defendant, for a considera-
tion of $10.000, a certain flour mill, orally
guaranteeing its capacity was 40 bbls. per
day. Wile paid $3,000 of the purchase
money and received possession of the- prop-
erty. After operating itawhile he discov-
ered that the capacity was but 10 bbls. per
day. Wile therefore undertook to chnnge
its machinery and power so that it would
produc: 40 bbls. per day, and in so doing
spent $8,000, and consequently refused to
pay any more of the purchase money, nor
would he give up the possession of the
property. Mapes now brings this action
of ejectment.
Mapes now agrees to reduce the balance
of the purchase money which is S7.000 to
$',500, on theclaim that had the mill been
only of the capacity of'10 bbls. per day it
would in the least be worth $7,000.
The 2ounsel for the defendant allege
that their client was induced to enter into
this contract by fraud and that the plain-
tiff should bear the burden. We think
that this point must be negatived. No
person can be held responsible for a inis
representation made through an honest
mistake. Fisher v. Mullen, 103 Mass. L03.
There is no evidence nor is there any
allegation on the part of the defendant
that the mill never was capable of produc-
ing 40 bbls. per day, and that by judicious
repairing it could have been put in condi-
tion where it would have been capable of
doing the same again.
Counsel for the defense claim that they
have suffered $8,000 damage by reason of
the mill's non-fulfillment of Mapes' guar-
anfee. In this we cannot concur. By
looking into the agreement it at once be-
comes apparent that Mapes did not con-
template giving a mill equal in value to
one having all new machinery.
The same mill with old machinery, pro-
ducing 40 bbls. per day, would be worth a
good deal less than if it had new machin-
ery of the same capacity. It therefore be-
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comes necessary for you to derive the
measure of damages by a different compu-
tation.
We are of the opinion that the doctrine
laid down in Walker v. France, 112 Pa.
203, is admirably adapted to the settle-
nient of this case. In the case just cited
the learned court holds that in an equit-
able action of ejeetment brought by the
vendor to recover the balance of purchase
money due upon a contract, the vendee
will be permitted to recoup the damages
sustained by reason of the vendor's inabil-
ity to comply with his contract.
It is well settled that equity will decree
specific performance of a contract when it
has already been so far performed, that it
would be inequitable to rescind the same.
Such are the circumstances here; the par-
ties cannot be placed in static quo without
doing an injustice to one or the other;
hence the only way open for you is to find
the measure of damages to which the de-
fendant is entitled as a set-off against the
$7,000 still due.
If Mr. Wile had spent the $8,000 in re-
pairs so as to bring the mill up to the
guarantee, it is clear that -he would have
been entitled to that amount as a set-off,
but we do not think that he was justified
in throwing out the old machinery and
changing it for new, such as would suit
his whim or fancy. If the ruling were
diffbrent, praise of one's own property
would be unsafe. If the property did not
conform with the letter of the guarantee,
the vendee could throw out the old ma-
chinery and put in new, nickel or silver-
plated, of the same capacity, but which
would cost more than the vendor's orig-
inal price and thus the vendor would get
nothin g for his property.
Now, gentlemen of the jury, the ques-
tion for you to decide is the difference in
value of two mill properties whose loca-
tion are identical, whose buildings are
identical, but whose productive powers
vary by 30 bbls. a day. The mill submit-
ted to your consideration is one which was
represented to produce 40 bbls. a day.
There has been no evidence submitted
that this was not its original capacity,
which must have been some ',ine ago, as
evidenced by the fact that the defendant
discarded the machinery as of no more
service. However this mill was still cap-
able of producing 10 bbls. per day.
Now it is for you to say what is the dif-
ference in value between the mill as rep-
resented and as it now is. Take then all
the evidence submitted to you with these
instructions, give it your careful consider-
ation and return a verdict, such as you
think does justice between the two liti-
gants.
The decree of the court is that whatever
this verdict may be, if reasonable, shall be
the defendsnt's set-off against the 57,000
still due, and judgment will be entered
thereon against Wile to remain in full
force and effect until satisfied.
W. B. GERY, P. J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The plaintiff in this case brings eject-
ment to recover possession of the mill
which had been the subject of a contract
of sale between the defendant and himself.
The plaintiff had orally guaranteed the
productive capacity of the mill at 40 bbls.
per day. On going into possession, how-
ever, the defendant found that the manu-
factory was capable of turning out but 10
bbls. per day, and in consequence of the
breach of warranty by plaintiff, defendant
took it upon himself to improve the mill
to such an extent as to bring it up to the
plaintiff's warranty. In so doing defend-
ant expended 58,000 and since he had
already paid $3,000 of thepurchase money,
he refuses to surrender possession on the
ground that he has already expended
more than the contract price of the mill,
to-wit, $10,000.
Had the defendant paid the full pur-
chase money instead of but a portion of it,
lie undoubtedly, as defendant claims,
could have successfully defended the ac-
tion of ejectment and compelled the plain-
till to deliver a deed to him. Here, how-
ever, the defendant had not paid the full
purchase price, and could not therefore
demand a deed or retain possession.
Mitchell's lessee v. De Roche, 1 Yeates 12,
was a case of ejectment by the vendor of
land against the vendee who was in pos-
session. The contract stipulated that the
purchase money was to be paid in install-
ments, and in pursuance thereof part of
the purchase money (the first installment)
was duly paid. The plaintiff; on the re-
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fusal of the defendant to pay the balance,
brought ejeetment, and the court say,
"Without payment of the full considera-
tion money the defendant is not entitled
to the premises on any principle of law or
equity." This same principle is also laid
down by the court in Marlin v. Willink,
7 S. & R. 297.
The learned counsel for the defendant
contend, however, that the plaintiff here
cannot recover in ejectment for the reason
that in order to do so he must set up his
own fraud. This point we also feel con-
strained to negative from the fact that
nothing appears in the statement of facts
sufficient to warrant us in presuming the
existence of a fraud, especially as the law
ever presumes against crime and fraud
whenever it can possibly do so consist-
ently with the statement of facts.
The defendant in the case at bar en-
deavors to use as a set-off the amount of
money he has expended in bringing the
mill up to the productive capacity guar-
anteed by the plaintiff. That a right of
set-off' for valuable improvements exists,
there can beno doubt. Walker v. France,
112 Pa. 203. The defendant, however, is
not to be allowed to set off the amount he
chose to expend in bringing the productive
capacity up to the warranty, but what the
expense incident to improving the mill
up to the guaranteed capacity actually
was. This amount is made the subject of
contention in this case, the defendant con-
tending that it was $8,000, the amount he
expended, and the plaintiff, on the other
hand, claiming that the value of the mill
at even 10 bbls. per day was $7,000, or
$6,500 at least, and therefore the differ-
ence in value of the mill as guaranteed
and as actually delivered was but $3,000,
although lie is willing, in order to settle
the case, to accept but $6,500 for it. Strange
to say, however, although the plaintiff
claims that $3,000 was sufficient to bring
the mill up to the warranty, and the de-
fendant contends that it was necessary to
expend 58,000 in so doing, yet neither
party has adduced any evidence to sup-
port his contention on this point, but
merely advances his own statements as to
what lie thinks was the necessary outlay.
Although this being a court of equity, the
court has power to decide questions of
fact as well as of law, yet in this case we
are at an utter loss to determine the differ-
ence between the pecuniary values of the
mill as guaranteed and as it was actually
delivered, for the reason above given, that
the parties differ as to the amount, but
neither adduces any evidence in substan-
tiation of his assertions.
We think, therefore, that as the defend-
ant wishes to make a set-off for improve-
ments he has made, the burden of proof
rests upon him to establish affirmatively
the amount mentioned above before lie is
entitled to such set-off. Since he has
failed to do this, we must consider as such
difference in the value of the mill as guar-
anteed and as delivered the amount con-
ceded by the plaintiff, to-wit, $3,500.
As a condition precedent to the recovery
of the mill, however, the plaintifrmnust
refund that amount of the purchase money
already paid by the defendant. Walker
v. France, 112 Pa. 203.
Therefore, unless the counsel for the de-
fendant, in accordance with the rules of
equity, moves for a postponement or a con-
tinuance, we will be obliged to enter judg-
nuent for the plaintiff to recover the prop-
erty in question on condition, however, of
his re-paying to the defendant the $3,000
purchase money already received by him
and the $3,500 conceded by the plaintiff to
be the difbrence between the value of the
mill as it was guaranteed by him and its
value as it actually was when delivered to
the defendant. HII. HARPEL, J.




STATE-MENT OF TiE CASE.
Plaintiff intending to go to Philadelphia
over the defendant's railroad, went to the
station at 9 I'. ir. in order to take the I I i'.
Mr. train. He entered the station and pur-
chased a ticket. In a few minutes thd
agent told him that he must close' the
stationi, as it vas a rule of the coniaiy
that it should be kept open only thirty
minutes betbre the train left. 1Plailiff
protested that lie had nowhere to go,.but
the agent threatened to eject him. He
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went outside and waited. The night was
bad. Plaintiff was thinly clad, and, as a
result, contracted a severe illness. This
action is brought to recover damages.
DEAL and ELDER for the plaintiff.
I. Plaintiff was a passenger (Dodge v.
ISteamship Co., 148 Mass. 207,) and there-
fore entitled to protection from injury and
to shelter. Grimes v. Pennsylvania Co.,
•6 Fed. 72; Gordon v. R. R. Co., 40 Barb.
546.
2. Theregdlation .was unreasonable, and
therefore the company is liable for injury
resulting from its enforcement by agents.
Pa. R R. Co. v. Langdon, 92 Pa:21; Lent
v. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 467.
FRANTZ and DAvis for the defendant.
1. The regulation was reasonable.
2. The plaintiff was guilty of contrib-
utory negligence, and therefore cannot
recover. Aspell v. R. R. Co., 23 Pa. 147;
'4ehofield v. Chicago R. R. Co., 8 Fed.
Rep. 488; Kennard v. N. J. R. R. Co., 21
Pa. 205.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The plaintiff, intending to go to Phila-
adelphia over the defendant's road, went
to the station at 9 o'cloek in the evening
in order to take the 11 o'clock train. He
purchased a ticket, and was subsequently
told by the agent to leave, as the r~ule of
the company necessitated his closing the
building until one-half hour before the
train started. Plaintiff protested that he
bad nowhere to go, but the agent threat-
ening to eject him, he went outside and
waited. The night was bad. Plaintiff
was thinly clad, and, as a result, con-
tracted a severe illness. He now brings
this action to recover damages.
The case, we think, involves two points:
(1) Is the reasonableness of the regulation
requiring the building to be closed until
thirty minutes before the train started a
question of law for the court, or of fact for
the jury ? (2) Was the regulation a reason-
able one?
When the facts are undisputed, the
reasonableness of the rule is a question of
law for the court. If it were otherwise,
there would be no uniformity as to what
constituted a reasonable rule, one jury
holding that a rule was reasonable, while
another jury might decide the same rule
to be unreasonable. Pittsburg Ry. Co. v.
Lyon, 123 Pa. 140; Louisville Ry. Co. v.
Fleming, 18 Am. & Rng. Ry. Cases 356;
Veddor v. Fellows, 2Q N. Y. 126.
The right of a railroad company to make
reasonable rules and regulations for its
own protection, and for the safety and con-
venience of its passengers, has been recog-
nized by our courts. Pennsylvania Ry.
Co. v. Langdon, 92 Pa. 27; Commonwealth
v. Power, 48 Mass. 596. As the plaintiff
had, by the purohase of a ticket with the
intention of goingon the next train for
Philadelphia, established the relation of
passenger and carrier-Dodge v. Boston
Steamship .Co., 148 Mass. 207, we have only
to consider the reasonableness of rules ap-
plicable to passengers as distinguished
from those relative to mere licensees.
The.doctrine of our courts is, that a rail-
road company is bound to omit no pre-
caution that would conduce to the safety
and protection of its passengers. New
Jersey Ry. Co. v. Kennard, 21 Pa. 204.
Applying this rule, we think the defend-
ant is liable for refusing to use that degree
of care necessary for the protection of its
passengers. As was said in Harris v.
Stevens, 31 Vt. 88, " Any person who de-
sires to go up.on the cars has the right in a
proppr manner, and at a suitable time, to
go upon the premises of the company at
any station where the passenger trains
stop to receive passengers for the purpose
of procuring a ticket and getting oil board,
and the company has no right to prevent
or hinder his coming on their premises,
or to order him to depart therefrom, before
the departure of the train ; and such per-
son has the right to remain on the prem-
ises of the company at such station until
the departure of the train."
The application must be made in a
proper manner, and at a suitable time.
What constitutes a suitable time must
necessarily depend upon the circumstances
of each case. The rule regarding the clos-
ing of a station, which is applicable to a
city depot, is certainly not applicable to a
small town in a rural district. From the
statement of facts, it appears that there
was no public -place for accommodations
in the neighborhood of the station, hence,
a rule compelling a person wishing to be-
come a passenger to remain outside of the
building until thirty minutes prior to the
starting of the train would certainly work
many hardships upon the patrons of the
road. Duringthe Winter months it would
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necessitate persons living at a distance
from the station to make no allowance for
mishaps when contemplating making
connection with a certain scheduled train,
lest in so doing they would be compelled
to subject themselves to exposure should
they arrive without accident.
The authorities seem to hold that a rule
which arbitrarily and unnecessarily sub-
jects the passengers to inconvenience, an-
noyance. loss and delay is unreasonable.
Pittsburg Hy. Co. v. Lyon, supra; Ved-
dor v. Fellows, supra; Summitt v. State,
9 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cases 302; Common-
wealth v. Power, supra; Hall v. Power,
53 Mass. 482. Relative to stations, Camp-
bell, J., in People v. McKay, 46 Mich.
440, says: "Passengers are entitled to re-
main in the station so long as they have
occasion to do so and commit no offense
against the good order of the place." Ap-
)lying the doctrine of these cases to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the regulation of the defend-
ant company is an unreasonable one.
This being our interpretation of the law,
it is your duty, gentlemen of the jury, to
find for the plaintiff the amount of dam-
ages to be assessed by you in your verdict.
H. M. COLLINS, J.
This is an action to recover damages for
injuries suffered by the plaintiff, Amos
Cummings, against the railroad company
for being expelled from its station, to
which he had gone about 9 o'clock, in-
tending to take the 11 o'clock train for
Philadelphia.
After arriving at the station he bought
a ticket for Philadelphia, expecting to re-
main in the station until the time for the
departure of his train. But he was in-
formed by the station agent thathe would
have to leave the station, as the company
allowed its stations to remain open but
thirty minutes before the departure of its
trains.
The plaintiff remonstrated against this,
claiming that he had no place to go, but
he was nevertheless obliged to leave the
station, and, being thinly clad, contracted
a scrious illness from being exposed to the
inclement weather. For the injuries suf-
fered he brings this action.
As soon as the plaintiff arrived at the
station he purchased a tickot from the
agent. By so doing did the railroad as-
sume the duties of a carrier of passengers
towards him, and did he bind himself to
live up to.all the reasonable rules and regu-
lations of the company?
The purchase of a ticket by a person, en-
titling him to travel between two stations,
creates the relation of carrier and passen-
ger, with all the duties imposed by law
upon each. Wabash R. Co. v. Rector, 9
Am. & Eg. R. Cases 264. It is not even
necessary that the person should have a
ticket. Going into the station, ticket office
or waiting room with the bona fide inten-
tion of becoming a passenger, ordinarily
places one in the position of a passenger.
Donovan v. Hartford St. R. Co., 65 Conn.
201. Also, a person who has purchased a
ticket, and is in the waiting room of the
company intending to take a train, is a
passenger. Carpenter v. Boston R. Co.,
21 Am. & Eng. R. Cases 331.
After a careful consideration of the cas.es
upon this sulject we are of the opinion
that the relation of passenger and carrier
existed between Cummings and the rail-
road company; therefore, the company
was bound to see that the plaintiff was
not injured on account of any neglect on
their part.
So, also, the plaintiff was bound to con-
form to all the reasonable rules and regu-
lations of the company.
This leaves usfreeto determine whether
the regulation of the company allowing
the station to remain open but thirty
minutes before the departure of trains was
a reasonable one. If the rule was reason-
able, then the plaintiff cannot recover for
any damages suffered, while, if not, he
can.
It is a well established rule of law, that
railroad companies have the right to adopt
such reasonable rules and regulations for
the management of their business as they
deem proper. Langdon v. Pa. R. R. Co.,
92 Pa. 21. But at the same time they must
see that no unjust methods are employed
in the carrying on of their business.
After sellingi to the plaintiff a ticket,
was it proper for the defendant to exclude
Cummings fiom their waiting room ?
This all depends upon the fact whether
the regulation of allowing their station to
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be open but thirty minutes before the de-
parture of trains was a reasonable one.
When the facts upon which the reason-
ableness or unreasonableness of aregulation
of a railroad company depend are undis-
lputed, then the determiningas to whether
the regulation is a reasonable one is a
question of law for the court. Pittsburg,
C. and St. L. R. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. 140 ;
Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N. Y. 126-13L The
facts being undisputed in this case, we
think it .s within the province of the court
to determine the reasonableness of the rule.
Two hours before the time for the arrival
of the train which the plaintiff expected
to take for Philadelphia, the defendant
company sold him aticket to that city.
After receiving his ticket he expected to
remain in the waiting room until his train
arrived, but he was expelled from the sta-
tion. The plaintiff claimed that he had
no place to go in order to be protected from
the weather, which was on that night
bad.
Could the company, under such condi-
tions, expel one of its passengers from its
waiting room?
A regulation of this nature would cause
great inconvenience to the passengers of
any railroad company. The traveling
public, as a general rule, are not residents
of the town in which the station is sit-
uated, especially in a town into which
several different railroads run. Passen-
gers come into the town on one road ex-
pecting to go out on another, and not
knowing the time of the departure of the
trains of the other roads, are oftentimes
compelled to remain in the town for hours.
Under such circumstances some people,
especially those of means, could go to a
hotel, while others less fortunate in a
financial way could not afford to do so.
But carriers of passengers must provide
accommodations for all classes of persons,
poor as well as rich.
Therefore, after duly reflectingupon the
rights of the relative parties, we are of the
opinion that the regulation in this case,
circumstances being such as they are, is
an unreasonable one, and that the requir-
ing of the plaintiff to expose himself to
th& weather, and the denying to him of
the use of its station, was a breach of the
duty which the carrier owed to the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff contracted a severe ill-
ness as a result of the exposure, and seeks
to recover damages for injuries suffered.
Considering the case as we have, we are
of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover damages forinjuries suffered on
account of the unjustifiable disregard of
his rights on the part of the railroad com-
pany.
L. PHILIP COBLENTZ, J.
WALTER WILLIAMS vs. C. V. R. IR.
COMPANY.
Liability of common carrier.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff -went to the station of the
defendant in Carlisle an hour before the
train started to purchase a ticket, but the
office wasmot open. He took his valise to
the baggage room and asked to have it
checked. The baggage master refused to
give him a check, it being the rule of the
company that he should not do so until
ticket is procured. He allowed plaintiff
to put his valise in the room where there
were a large number of other pieces of
baggage.
Five minutes before the time at which
the train left Williams went to the. station
to get his valise. Without any fault of
his, his valise had been mixed with other
unchecked baggage. He was so delayed
in finding the valise that he had no time
to buy a ticket.
On the train the conductor demanded
the regular fare and ten cents additional.
He declined to pay the extra ten cents
and was ejected. This action is brought
to recover damages sustained.
KOSTENBANDER and HEIST for the
plaintiff.
1. The defendant company is liable for
the baggage, even, though no check has
been given, (Hickox v. R. R. Co., 31 Coni.
281; Green v. Milwaukee R. R. Co., 41
Iowa 410), or if ticket has not yet been
purchased. Green v. Milwaukee R. R.
Co., Supra; Hickox v. R. R. Co., Supra.
Lake Shore R. R. Co. v. Foster, 104 Ind
293.
2. Baggage master's negligence is the
proximate cause of plaintiff's loss.
DEEBLE and KATZ for the defendant.
1. Defendant was a "gratuitous bailee"
and is liable only for gross negligence.
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154 Pa. 296. The rules of the company
relative to checking baggage and exacting
ten cents extra in fares paid on the train
are reasonable. The passenger must ac-
quaint himself with such rules, and if he
oes not, a carrier is not liable. Terra
Haute R. R. Co., 111 Ill., 202; 2 Wood on
Railroads, Pg. 1203; Reese v. Pa. R. R.
Co., 131 Pa. 422; Manchester R. R. Co.,
132 Mass. 116; Ritter v. P. & R. R. R. Co.,
2 V. N: C. 382; 3 Wood on Railroads, Pg.
1668; Lake Shore and Mich. Southern R.
R. v. Rosenzeweig, 113 Pa. 519.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
It is the opinion of the court that it is
immaterial whether or not the deposit of
the baggage was a gratuitous bailment.
The point of law involved here is whether,
under the circumstances cited, the de-
fendant could compel the plaintiff to pay
the extra ten cents, which was customary
to charge passengers who had not pur-
chased their tickets at the ticket office.
Williams, the plaintiff, arrived one
hour before train time and found the
ticket office closed. He returned five
minutes before train time, but by his own
negligence in not allowing himself suffi-
cient time to get his baggage which he
had left in the baggage room unchecked,
he was unable to get a ticket at the office
and had to board the train without one.
One of the regulations of the company
was that passengers, who had not pur-
chased their tickets at the ticket office,
should pay an additional ten cents to the
conductor above the usual fare. This the
plaintiff refused to do and was conse-
quently ejected.
It was unreasonable for the plaintiff to
expect to find the ticket office at Carlisle
open one hour before train time. In fact
such has never been the custom and the
traffic does not warrant it. Hence the
plaintiff should have returned within a
reasonable time to purchase his ticket,
when the ticket office was open.
It is a recognized rule of law that car-
riers have power to make and enforce
reasonable rules and regulations concern-
ing the conduct of their business. Pas-
sengers and other persons who avail them-
selves of the accommodations offered by
such carriers must inform themselves of
such regulations and observe them. Wood
on R. R. page 1203, vol. 2.
If the defendant had not given- the
plaintiff an opportunity to purchase the
ticket at the ticket office, another question
might present itself. However, it is ac-
knowledged that such an opportunity was
offered by the defendant, and that the
plaintiff did not allow himself enough
time to take advantage of it.
Carriers of passengers have a right to
make all regulations for the proper con-
duct of their business which are not un-
reasonable.
Bennett v. R. R. Co., 7 Phila. 11; Mc-
Elroy v. R. R. Co., 7 Phila. 206.
The regulation is one which exists on
all railroads and is reasonable because it
facilitates the collection of fares and pro-
tects the company from possible embezzle-
ment by conductors, and it should make
no difference whether a rebate is given for
the additional charge or a discount is,
given to the parties who purchase their
tickets at the ticket office.
Reese v. Penn R. R. Co., 131 Pa. 422;
Ritten v. Phila. R. R. Co., 2 W. N. C 382.
Judgment for defendant.
WALT. TAYLOR, J.
In the case at bar the plaintiff, Walter
Williams, went to the station of the Cum-
berland Valley R. R. Co. in Carlisle one
hour before time and found the ticket
office closed. He took his valise to the
baggage room, where the baggage master
refused to check it because he had no
ticket. He allowed Williams to leave it
in the room with a lot of other baggage.
Five minutes before train time, Williams
returned for his valise but found that
through no fault of his it was so mixed
with a lot of unchecked baggage that
when found he bLad no time to, purchase a
ticket, so boarded a train without one.
On the train the conductor demanded the
regular fare plus ten cents. He declined
to pay the excess and was ejected. He
brings this action to recover.
It is a well established fact that a R. R.
Company may charge persons, who by
their own fault are unprovided with tick-
ets, any amount of excess fare provided
they do not exceed the rate allowed by
charter or any reasonable sum with a re-
bate ticket. This is allowed that the com-
pany may protect itself from conductors
appropriating fares. But the person must
be without a ticket through his own fault.
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If by negligence of some of the company's
agents he is not bound to pay excess.
The decisions hold that a R. R. Com-
pany assumes the duties and liabilities of
a common carrier when it receives the
person's baggage whether checked or not
and even if he has no ticket if there is the
understanding that he is to purchase one.
In 31 Conn. 281, Butler, 3., quoting from
"Redfield on Railways," says: "The de-
livery and acceptance, the abandonment
of all care of the baggage by the passenger
and the assumption of it by the agents of
the company or carrier expressly or im-
pliedly for the purpose of transportation,
which fix the liability of the carriers as
such, and that liability begins when the
baggage is delivered to the agent of the
company for carriage."
In Jordan v. Fall River R. R. Co., 5
Cush. 69, the court held it to be the duty
of a company to keep an agent to take
charge of the baggage of parties not hav-
ing tickets but intending to get them.
In order to clear himself from negli-
gence the intended passenger must allow
a reasonable time in which to get his
ticket, and we think that in this case five
minutes was ample time for him to get a
ticket, recover his valise and have it
checked, and if it had not been for the
negligence of the company's agent in mix-
ing it with other baggage he would have
done so. Common carriers are liable for
slight negligence. The company in ac-
cepting his valise assumed the duties and
obligations of a common carrier. Wil
liams, the plaintiff, was prevented from
buying a ticket by the agent's negligence,
in which case he was not bound by the
law allowing companies -to charge excess
fare to persons unprovided with tickets.
In view of these facts we think plaintiff
should recover damages in this action.
C. C. SLOAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The court below being equally divided
upon the ability of the plaintiff on the
facts to recover, judgment went for the
defendant. The plaintiff therefore ap-
peals to this court.
The rule of the company requires pas-
sengers nQt having a ticket to pay ten
cents more than the ordinary fare. When
the conductor demanded this additional
fare, Williams refused to pay it, and was
thereupon ejected from the train. That a
passenger who has not paid and refuses to
pay his fare may be ejected, is too well es-
tablished to require citation of authority.
That the company may require an addi-
tional fare from those who have boarded
the car without a ticket is also well settled.
Reese v. Pa. R. R., 131 Pa. 422; Lake
Shore Railway Co. v. Greenwood, 79 Pa.
373; Ritter v. Phila. and Reading R. R.
2 W. N. 382. Prima facie therefore Wil-
liams was properly ejected by the conduc-
tor.
He justifies his refusal to pay the addi-
tional 10 cents by the allegation and evi-
dence that he was prevented from buying
a ticket before mounting the car by the
improper acts of the servants of the com-
pany. What are these acts?
When he requested the baggage master
to check the satchel that servant refused
because of a rule forbidding him to do so
until a ticket had been procured. This
rule is entirely reasonable. The master
should have some evidence that the
satchel is entitled to carriage, and the
production of the ticket by its owner is
reasonable evidence. Coffee v. Louisville
& Nashville R. R., (Miss.) 45 L. R. A. 112.
The baggage-master, however, while re-
fusing to check the satchel, received it into
the baggage-room, ashe should have done.
Up to this point no negligence is imputa-
ble to the railroad. It seems, however,
that during the fifty or fifty-five minutes
that followed the satchel had become
"mixed with other unchecked baggage,"
so that when Williams came for it, the
search consumed time and he was obliged
to mount the car without a ticket, or wait
for the next train. He preferred to mount
the car.
When he decided to board the car, we
think he should have also decided to pay
the additional fare. The conductor was
bound, as he knew, by a rule which re-
quired him to put passengers off who
neither offered a ticket nor the additional
fare. The conductor could know whether
the ticket or this fare was produced; but
he could- not know the facts asserted by
Willia'ms to excuse him. It would be
unreasonable to require the conductor to
decide upon these facts on the mere asser-
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tion of the passenger. If Williams, in
fact, had a good cause for not obtaining a
ticket, he might possibly recover the ad-
ditional fare from the company, after
paying it; but he should have paid it, and
avoided expulsion from the carby the con-
ductor under circumstances seeming to
that officer to justify and require such ex-
pulsion.
It does not distinctly appear that the
delay in discovering the satchel was the
result of any improper act of the baggage-
master, or the servant of the company.
Nor is it entirely clear that a passenger
may wait until five minutes before the
train starts, before he goes to the station.
Did he start for the station, or did he reach
the station, five minutes before the de-
parture of the train? At what time did
he begin his search for the satchel? And
how long .did he search before he found
it? Was the inability to get the ticket
due in part to the number of passengers
ahead of him at the window? The evi-
dence furnished by the plaintiff is entirely
too vague to justify the finding by a jury
that the failure to get a ticket was due to
an unduly long search for the satchel, oc-
casioned by what had happened in the
baggage-room.
Judgment affirmed.
OVERSEERS OF POOR vs. JOHN
HALL.
Parent's liability for support of child.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Adam Hall is partially blind but strong
and able to do manual labor not requiring
ordinary sight. A. can see well enough
to walk without being led by the hand,
and can go alone to any place where he
has once been. He is twenty-five years
,,d; has always lived with his father,
John Hall, in the Township of R., and has
refused to work.
A. has lately married. His wife lived
with him and was also supported by John
Hall. A. still refused to work and John
l all refused to board A. and his wife any
longer. A. had no means of his own and
applied to the Overseers of the Poor of the
Township of R., who supplied A. and hi s
wife with necessaries and notified A.'s
father, John Hall, that they would hold
him liable. The first month the overseers
paid fourteen dollars ($14.00) for necessar-
ies, and they now bring this suit against
John Hall to recover the fourteen dollars.
RYAN and MACDONALD for the plaintiff.
1. The defendant is liable both under
the common and statute law. Act of
June 13, 1836, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3544. This is
not so where the child has obtained his
majority, unless he has always subsisted
by the parent.
2. When the parentrefuses to maintain,
he is liable for necessaries provided for the
child by others. Act of June 13. ]836,
Sec. 29, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3545, and See. 4, Id.
2 P. & L. Dig. 3531, as to duty of the over-
seers.
YEAGER and MIss MARVEL for the de-
fendant.
I. The legal duty of a father to support
his child ceases as soon as child becomes
of age. 2 Kent Coin. 189-190; Boyd v.
Sapington, 4 Watts 247; Clement's Appeal,
18 Co. Ct. 71; Central PoorDist. v. B irner,
5 Kulp 265; Mt. Pleasant Overseers v.
Wilcox, 12 C. C. 447.
2. The father cannot be liable under
Act of June 13, 1836, for that act does not
provide for the support of the wife. The
poor person must be "not able to work,"
and the father, etc., must be of "sufficient
ability." Mft. Pleasant Overseers v. Wil-
cox, 12 C. C. 447; Com. v. Miller, 8 0. C.
526; Bradford Co. Poor Dist. v. Case, 2 C.
C. 644. The action is wrongly brought.
According to the Act of June 13,1836, the
overseers should petition the Court of
Quarter Sessions for an order. See sup-
plement passed April 15. A857, 2 P. & L.
Dig. 3545; Wertz v. Blair Co.. 66 Pa. 18;
Delaney Twp. v. Greenwich Twp. C6 Pa.
63; Darlington v. Darlington. 5 C. C. 1:32.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an attempt to compel a father to
reimburse a township for the support of
his son. The 28th section of the. Act of
June 13, 1836, 2 P. & L. 3544, enacts that
"the father * * * 0 * of every poor
person not able to work shall, at their own
charge, being of sufficient ability, relieve
and maintain such poor person at such
rate as the court of quarter sessions of the
county where such poor person resides
shall order and direct, on pain of forfeit-
ing 6i sum not exceeding $20 for every
month they shall fail therein, which shall
be levied by the process of the said court
and applied to the relief and maintenance
of, such poor person."
The person for whose support the father
is thus made liable, is a "poor person not
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able to work." Adam Hall is "partially
blind, but strong and able to do manual
labor not requiring ordinary sight." He
has also "refused to work."1 It does not
appear that he is "not able to work." He
is 2.5 years old. One of the pre-conditions
to the liability of John Hall is therefore
non-existent. Clements' Petition, 18 Pa.
C. C. 71; Poor District v. Hirner, 5 Kulp
265; Mt. Pleasant Overseers v. Wilcox, 12
Pa. C. C. 447.
The father is to relieve and maintain his
child at his own charge, "being of suffi-
cient ability." Comv. Miller, 8 Pa. C. C.
525. We have discovered no evidence of
the ability of John Hall. Adam had al-
ways lived with his father until recently.
But from this we might as readily infer
that the father has refused to board him
any longer because of inability, as that he
had retained his ability but lost his dis-
position.
It does not appear that John Hall has
any estate. He may have only the skill
and force of his hands as a source of in-
come, and this may be too meagre to be
divided between himself and his son.
Com. v. Miller, 8 Pa. C. C. 525.
The jurisdiction for the enforcement of
the liability of the father is not in the
common pleas, where the present action is
brought, but in the quarter sessions. Sec.
28, Act June 13th, 1836, 2 P. & L. 3544;
Sec. 1. Act April 15th, 1857; 2 P. & L. 3545;
Wertz v. Blair county, 66 Pa. 18.
For the reasons stated, judgment is en-
tered on -the case stated in favor of the de-
fendant.
